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Cake day: July 5th, 2023

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  • AI, like all computer programs, is really good at being persistent.

    From the beginning of computer programming, the ability to engage in loops to exhaust every possibility was always going to be faster and more comprehensive than what humans could, or were willing to do. You could naively try every combination for cracking PINs. Then came more sophisticated loops that would try every combination by first going through known password patterns (common dictionary words, common numerical combinations, etc.). There were rainbow tables computed to where certain computationally expensive processes could be pre-computed before a leak so that a leak of hashed passwords could be more quickly exploited.

    And there are tools scanning the web for all sorts of known vulnerabilities, being much more comprehensive and systematic. If you have a vulnerable machine exposed to the internet, an automated hacker might compromise it.

    The current state of AI-assisted hacking includes tools for analyzing patches and CVEs to reverse engineer exploits for unpatched machines. So everyone is now in a hurry to apply patches as soon as they come out, lest they be left behind as hackers adapt their scripts to keep crawling for recently patched vulnerabilities.

    Plus there are more tools for searching for vulnerabilities, either in code or at some sort of other attack surface. The number of vulnerabilities being patched right now is pretty high, which puts just higher pressure on all of the processes to more aggressively develop quick patches for known vulnerabilities, install patches as soon as possible after release, etc.

    Throw in an ecosystem where programmers might have been laid off, or teams are understaffed, or using AI tools themselves and have less of a firm grasp on their own codebase, and that’s just a recipe for less reliability.












  • Repaying debt is cash cost. But this is convertible debt that could be converted to stock, in which case the holders of those newly converted shares don’t get paid cash from the company, but instead own a chunk of the company worth more than that cash. So the conversion itself would alleviate the cash demands of the company, while also diluting the ownership stakes of any preexisting owner. That’s what that paragraph means.

    Companies issue convertible bonds usually because they can get better interest rates on it, in the event that they need to repay it. Or they’re happy to deal with diluting their shares if the company becomes so valuable, because that means they’ve gotten a lot richer and just have to share their newfound riches with the lender.


  • That’s the tradeoff, of course. If a company liquidates, it pays its debts first, then its preferred stockholders, then its common stockholders. But each step down the line gives a greater upside in exchange for less certainty in getting paid at all. Bondholders get paid at higher priority, but have the exact amount they get paid defined by a specific mathematical formula. So they won’t get any additional benefit from the company becoming super valuable. Or they can get in the back of the line to see what unlimited upside they have from the company’s value going up a lot.

    Also, Anthropic’s bonds aren’t exactly low interest. They’re right there at the edge between junk bond and investment grade.


  • Usually companies will publish an “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization” or EBITDA as a way to show whether their core business is actually profitable (even if shareholders aren’t the ones to get the benefit of that business’s operating profit). But that’s not a standardized metric, and Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) won’t define earnings in that way.

    The big problem is that the more a company has to deal with high cost of borrowing and huge capital expenditures, the more disconnected EBITDA is from actual GAAP earnings. I can build a hotel for a billion dollars and rent out a bunch of rooms, while each room transaction brings in way more money than it costs for me to have a guy at the front desk give them a key and housekeeping to clean their room, I need to actually make a lot more in order to cover the cost of all the furniture I put in the room, the construction costs on the building, and the interest payments to the bank that financed the whole thing. And if the furniture and the building won’t actually last long enough to where I made all my money back before I have to reinvest a bunch of money into renovations and new furniture, then I don’t have a profitable business. Or if it can be profitable on those numbers but I can’t cover the interest payments to the bank, then the bank will eventually take it over and I’ll lose the business entirely, so owning stock in that company isn’t worth all that much.

    So if they’re saying they’re barely profitable when you take out the very expensive costs of training new models, entering big expensive deals with data center companies to build out infrastructure, the stock they keep issuing to employees and partners, etc., that might keep things going a bit longer, but it’s still not actually a path to true GAAP profitability.


  • This right here is how all of this will come crashing down

    No, this is pretty normal, and more importantly, doesn’t actually cost the company cash. They gave lenders bonds that can be converted to stock, so this loss on their books is pure paper loss, the same way wealth in owning stock in this money losing company is pure paper wealth.

    These numbers are just illustration for simplicity, but imagine a company borrowing $20 billion and telling the lender that you’ll either pay back the $20 billion plus interest, or they can opt to convert it into stock worth 10% of the company. When the company is worth $100 billion, the bondholders won’t convert to stock. But if the value of the company shoots up on paper to where that same stock would be worth $100 billion, the lenders would rather take the stock than the cash repayment. And because it’s worth $80 billion more, the company will have to record that on the books as replacing $20 billion in bonds for $100 billion in stock, and an $80 billion loss compared to their last statement.

    But look at the underlying financial cash flow. When that happens, the company actually takes $20 billion in debt off their books. They don’t have to repay that loan anymore. So it improves their cash flow position at exactly the same time that they’re booking a loss.

    The whole thing will come crashing down for totally different reasons, relating to operational cash flow, not the actual accounting shenanigans where one kind of paper number gets converted to another kind of paper number.




  • plagiarism

    outright theft

    It frustrates me to see that people are suddenly protective of some kind of intellectual property right of people to control creations after they’ve been created.

    I’m pretty skeptical of AI and have my doubts that it will be a net good, but I’m definitely not gonna suddenly be pro-copyright as part of that fight. Copyright has traditionally been used to entrench corporate interests, and strengthening those protections isn’t going to suddenly win a fight against some kind of AI dystopia.


  • Once there’s a public expectation for profit from the two biggest AI labs

    I don’t think that it’s necessarily the order things will go.

    Anthropic and OpenAI have bills to pay, including obligations to pay a ton of money to partners/vendors in the coming years. They need cash to do that. And the cash can come from 3 main places: revenue from customers, loans from lenders (usually in the form of issuing bonds), and issuing new stock/equity to raise funds.

    The IPOs are basically their last chance to raise funds by issuing new equity. Even if each of them raise $100 billion, that’s probably not enough to hit self sustaining profitability. As lenders start to get more skeptical, in a macroeconomic environment with high interest rates and high energy prices, they start to run into a very real possibility that they hit illiquidity issues, even if their core business model actually works by then (and I don’t think it will). There’s just not enough runway for them, even in the most optimistic long term projections.